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The science fiction novel Quarantine portrays a world wherein interaction
with human observers is necessary to collapse quantum wavefunctions. The
author, Greg Egan, amusingly puts the emphasis on the observers being human
— aliens can’t do it. Aliens are therefore at a tremendous disadvantage. As
we gaze at the night sky, we are constantly collapsing alien worlds, depriving
them of their branch diversity. Whole civilizations are being snuffed out by our
observations! Understandably the aliens grow tired of this. In response they
erect an impenetrable shield around the solar system, one that blinds us to the
outside universe. This shield protects the rest of the universe from harmful
human observation, locking humanity into a starless Bubble.
When confronting scientific realism with quantum mechanics, many philoso-
phers advocate the theoretical counterpart of this fictional strategy. Quantum
mechanics is beset with notoriously difficult interpretational challenges. Differ-
ent interpretations of the theory are compatible with present data. Only the
most unreconstructed positivist thinks these different interpretations (different
theories, really) are notational variants, i.e., different representations of the same
facts. Scientific realism holds that most of the statements of our mature scien-
tific theories are approximately true; but this claim is threatened by persistent
underdetermination of theory by evidence, for one theory isn’t better confirmed
than its rivals. Faced with this threat, some try to lock the quantum interpreta-
tion problem into a theoretical Bubble, cordoning off the interpretational blight
and leaving the rest of the world safe for scientific realism.
My goal in this paper is to pop this Bubble. No shield can really protect the
poor aliens in Egan’s story, nor can any theoretical membrane protect scientific
realism from dealing with the quantum measurement problem. One may be able
to erect barriers around the observable or classical, preserving a realism about
tables, chairs and the like, but there is no safety zone within the quantum
realm, the domain of our best physical theory. The upshot is not necessarily
that scientific realism is in trouble. That conclusion demands further arguments.
The lesson instead may be that scientific realists ought to stake their case on
particular interpretations of quantum theory. In any case, the realist can’t
ignore the interpretational issues plaguing quantum mechanics.
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1 The Quantum Blight
Quantum theory is one of the most successful sciences we have ever developed.
It is a rigorous formalism attached to rich experimental practices. Together, the
formalism and experimental practices allow us to make bold and novel predic-
tions that have been confirmed time and again for over 90 years. Unfortunately,
it’s not clear what world is being described by this theory. We need to know the
“word-world” connections. What do the terms in the formalism represent in the
outside world, if they represent? For example, does the wavefunction represent
our knowledge, a real field evolving in a high dimensional space, a complicated
field on a low-dimensional space, an aspect of a law of nature, or what? The
question isn’t solely directed at the quantum state. It applies to everything in
the theory — the q’s, p’s, σ’s, and more.
Word-world questions arise with every theory. Does classical particle me-
chanics portray a world with forces, with three equal types of mass (active,
passive, inertial) or one type? Options exist. The main difference with the
situation in quantum theory is that quantum theory, unlike classical mechanics,
suffers from the infamous measurement problem. The measurement problem in
effect shows that the word-world connections offered by the standard “Copen-
hagen” interpretation are inconsistent — or at the very least, lack theoretical
virtues that we normally expect of a theory (see, e.g., Bell 1987). It’s a huge
flag calling attention to the need for clear and consistent representational con-
nections for quantum mechanics.
Answers exist. Too many. There are Bohmians, followers of Bohm 1952,
who hold that quantum mechanics is incomplete and supplement it with addi-
tional ontology. There are advocates of Collapse, like GRW 1986, who propose
modifications to the linear wave evolution. There are Everettians who posit
a kind of multiverse (Everett 1957). Hybrids of all three theories exist. For
instance, one can divide Collapse interpretations into “Everettian Collapse” and
“Bohmian Collapse” theories, depending on whether the theory posits beables
in addition to the wavefunction (Allori et al 2008). A similar claim can be made
for Everett, as one can interpret Everett as positing a matter density distribu-
tion like GRW (Allori et al 2011) or even create a kind of Bohmian multiverse
(Sebens 2015a). Answers with a more “pragmatic” or “instrumentalist” flavor ex-
ist, including Healey’s recent pragmatic view and Fuchs’ Quantum Bayesianism
(see Healey 2017 and this volume for discussion and references). The diversity
of worlds possibly described by quantum mechanics is shocking. One might
stubbornly insist that the difference with classical mechanics is one of degree,
that both theories have unresolved word-world questions. Fine, but the number
of degrees is huge. Nothing compares classically, for example, to the contrast
between the sparse ontology of GRW (with “flash” ontology) and the generous
ontology of Everett.
The interpretations describe dramatically different ontologies, but more than
that, they typically offer different laws of nature and different core theoretical
edifices. Collapse theorists modify the linear dynamical evolution of the wave-
function. Bohmians offer a guidance equation for their particles or fields. It’s
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hard to find a theoretical core that they all have in common such that we can re-
gard them all as different interpretations of that core. Even the operator algebra
that is taught in every quantum text is contested: for instance, for Bohmians,
Hilbert space and the operator algebra are an emergent measurement formalism
having no place in the fundamental description of nature, whereas for Quantum
Bayesianism, that formalism is the core. For these reasons the many “interpre-
tations” are clearly different theories.
A clearer picture is painted by conceiving these “interpretations” as different
Lakatosian research programs (Lakatos 1978). A research program is a series of
theories sharing a “hard core” of temporarily unimpeachable theoretical posits.
Quantum mechanics is a live theory, one being extended to new forms and
realms. The non-relativistic theory of 1925 is applied to new systems daily,
from ever more sophisticated treatments of helium to the recent discovery of
non-equilibrium time crystals. The theoretical structure was also transformed
into QED, QCD and the standard model, and we hope to integrate cosmology
and gravity with the quantum. The interpretations typically have something
to say about all these developments. Often how they respond changes the laws
and ontology posited by the theory, e.g., as we’ll see, Bohmian quantum field
theory may posit different ontology than non-relativistic Bohm theory. With so
much different, in what sense can we speak of an interpretation or theory? The
answer is that each “interpretation” is really a research program.
Lakatos’ “negative heuristic” is that which is unrevisable in each program
and defines its “hard core”: Everettians all hold that macroscopic superposition
indicates multiplicity; Bohmians all postulate ontology guided by a new equa-
tion hooked up to a wave equation; advocates of Collapse all modify the wave
equation to produce a unified story of the macro and micro realms; Quantum
Bayesians are committed to the idea that wavefunctions represent the amount
of information one has about a system. These hard cores are carried along
when each “interpretation” is applied to some new domain or theory. Lakatos’
“positive heuristic”, by contrast, is that which is revisable within each program.
Bohmians can propose new choices of ontology to be guided by the wavefunction
if they are better suited to the pheneomena, Collapse theorists can tinker with
the size, timing and triggers of collapse. Thus understood, even dramatic de-
partures, such as Collapse approaches to semi-classical quantum gravity (Okon
and Sudarsky 2015) and Bohmian approaches to superstring theory (Weingard
1996), are easily recognized as descendants of the original families.
Carve answers to the measurement problem into four broad research pro-
grams. Little hangs on this division, and I’m happy to acknowledge that dif-
ferent partitions and hybrid theories exist. Using one reasonable partition, we
find four active research programs: Bohmian, Everettian, Collapse, and Prag-
matist/Bayesian programs—each very broadly construed. The last of these
programs doesn’t aspire to characterize or represent a complete physical reality.
These views are often accused of being instrumentalist interpretations. Whether
this accusation is fair or not, this last set of programs will not be relevant to
realism and the present worry of underdetermination because it doesn’t offer us
a representation of physical reality. We therefore have three live research pro-
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grams (Bohm, Collapse, and Everett), each portraying dramatically different
realities (for accessible discussions of each, see Maudlin forthcoming).
Confined to nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, experimentally there is no
way to confirm one over the other. Bohm and Everett use precisely the same
algorithm for extracting predictions (Born’s rule). Collapse typically uses a
slightly modified one that differs negligibly in the macroscopic realm from what
Bohm and Everett use. Philosophers sometimes raise the distinction between
pairs of theory being “in principle” undermined by data and other pairs merely
being “in practice” so underdetermined. Collapse and Bohm/Everett, they might
say, are then in principle empirically distinguishable unlike Bohm and Everett.
But as we know from Laudan and Leplin 1991, it’s not clear that the “in principle
versus in practice” distinction is itself an in-principle one. And when comparing
research programs as opposed to artificially frozen theories and fixed empirical
domains, it’s not clear that this distinction is so useful. There are plenty of ex-
periments we can imagine that would provide a crucial test of Collapse against
other theories. Collapse posits two new constants of nature, the collapse width
and the collapse rate. Some choices of these parameter pairs have already been
“falsified” by experiments involving spontaneous x-ray emission. Had the orig-
inal GRW theory chosen such a pair, the theory would now be demonstrably
false. However, with room remaining in the “unfalsified” parameter space, an
advocate of Collapse in that scenario could simply shift to a new parameter
pair, saying that he or she learned better. The Collapse research program can
survive falsification of some particular parameter pairs. For this kind of reason,
no Popperian crucial test between research programs is likely in the foreseeable
near future.1
2 Dialing Up Underdetermination
Underdetermination of theory by data is a phenomenon that can happen, as
the phrase suggests, when the empirical data do not narrow down the space
of acceptable theories to one. As a logical matter, left at this, this situation
is guaranteed to always obtain. We know from the curve fitting problem that
a finite number of data points can be connected via an infinity of curves. If
we treat each curve as a theory, then we always face massive underdetermi-
nation of theory by data. In the philosophy of science, however, we curiously
restrict the available theories to properly “scientific” ones. I say this is curious
because philosophers of science, of all people, know that the label “scientific” is
notoriously vague. What is meant?
1 Detractors of each program may object to what I’ve said here. Critics of Everett will
insist that Everettians cannot recover the Born rule predictions due to the theory’s well-known
problem with probabilities, so we don’t know if it’s empirically adequate. Critics of Collapse
will raise worries about the tails problem and related threats to the available parameter space
(Sebens 2015b). Critics of Bohm will point out that it hasn’t been fully extended to quantum
field theory and is therefore not empirically adequate in the relativistic realm. Each worry is
very serious. I explicitly tackle the last in section 5. However, for present purposes, because
I’m discussing programs as opposed to static theories, I’m inclined to be generous and hope
that each can overcome their challenges, especially the ones they’re actively working on.






Fig. 1: The Scientific Dial
Imagine a dial (see 1) that we can set to more or less “scientific.” Admittedly
oversimplistic, we might think of the settings as measuring increasing theoretical
virtues. The lowest setting might be mere logical consistency. When the dial is
set there all sorts of wild and intuitively “unscientific” theories count. Skeptical
nightmares like Descartes’ demon theory and Putnam’s brain-in-a-vat theory
count as scientific because they are consistent. In terms of curve-fitting, this
setting allows even the most “wiggly” of curves. The result of this theory is
massive underdetermination. Turning the dial up winnows down the number of
contending research programs. Suppose we insist not only on consistency but
also on the theory being predictively useful to human beings, unified, consilient,
simple, etc. Then when we turn the knob Descartes’ demon theory drops out
because it isn’t predictively useful to human beings. In principle, being super
strict with what we mean by “scientific” could winnow the acceptable theories
down to one. Let’s not go that far. The philosopher of science dealing with
underdetermination instead sets the dial at a sense of scientific that a consensus
would agree upon as genuinely scientific, a sense that would separate good
scientific theories from pseudoscientific claims (e.g., evolution from creationism).
What happens?
Arguably, at a sufficiently coarse-grained level, such a setting in biology
restricts the available theories down to one, namely, the modern synthesis of
molecular biology and Darwinian selection. No serious scientific rivals exist,
although of course at a finer scale all manner of controversy erupts. By contrast,
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if we focus on quantum phenomena, we are left with our four programs, three of
which describe in detail very different worlds. Although many of the terms used
are a bit vague, still the contrast between the situation in quantum mechnaics
and modern biology is striking.
The three quantum research programs pose a prima facie threat to scientific
realism. The realist holds that most claims about observable and unobservable
facts made by a mature scientific theory are true or approximately true. Agree
for the moment that Collapse is mature and successful. One can’t defend a
belief in collapses if one at the same time admits that the evidence equally well
supports a theory without them.
Are we really in this situation? Prima facie, yes. In a perceptive paper
John Norton 2008 attacks the idea that underdetermination is guaranteed. The
artificial playthings of philosophers that serve to justify a state of permanent
general underdetermination fail, he thinks. I agree. There is no automatic proof
of general underdetermination. It’s not easy meeting the demands of the above
dial when it is set high. However, Norton also hints that most cases, general or
not, are probably not threatening. Is that the case here? Consider two theories
underdetermined by the data, T and T´. Let’s examine the three cases he
envisions.
First case: T and T´ predict the same observational evidence E and they
are inter-translatable about unobservable content. That is certainly not the case
for our three programs. There are no translations of a Collapse swerve nor a
Bohm particle into their rivals, respectively.
Second case: T´ is parasitic upon T, but T´ is epistemically inequivalent
to the original. Suppose T implies E and that T´ = T&H. Then as Norton
points out, good theories of confirmation do not automatically agree that if E
confirms T it also confirms T´ = T&H, where H is some arbitrary hypothesis.
Again, none of our three research programs are parasitic upon one another in
this sense. One encounters the claim that Bohm is Everett “in denial”. The
thought is that Bohm simply adds a hypothesis about which Everett “branch”
is occupied by particles. However no one would claim that this is parasitism
in this cheap “&H ” sense. If it were, it would be trivial to generate successful
field extensions of Bohm – but it’s not. So if parasitic, it’s not in this automatic
sense. In any case, the “in denial” charge is in my opinion wrong for many
reasons and on some interpretations not remotely plausible (Callender 2015 and
references therein).
Third case: T and T´ are not inter-translatable but “similar,” and Norton
thinks, therefore likely to be theoretically identical. Norton doesn’t say why
similarity makes identity likely, but let’s grant him that it does raise the sus-
picion. He suggests that Bohm and Copenhagen are in this relationship. It’s
hard to understand the reason why, as Copenhagen isn’t consistent, or if it is,
it seems to fundamentally cleave the world into classical and quantum regimes
according to fuzzy rules—neither of which is the case in Bohm. Nor are the
theories similar structurally, as the Hilbert space formalism that is central to
Copenhagen isn’t a crucial part of Bohmian mechanics. Unless similarity is un-
derstood as simply empirical equivalence, there is little reason to take the three
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research programs considered here to collapse into one.
With these research programs, it seems that we face the realist’s nightmare.
Many philosophers suspected that the threat of underdetermination is artificial,
confined to excessive flights of imagination and not genuinely scientific theories.
However, these three programs are neither philosopher’s toys nor notational
variants (on any remotely reasonable semantics) and are clearly “scientific” in
letter and spirit. Quantum underdetermination is the real deal.
3 Underdetermination within Underdetermination?
Quantum underdetermination may be worse than just characterized. I described
three programs, but there is potentially a lot of underdetermination within each
too. My hope, however, is that many of these empirically equivalent theories will
turn out to be uncontroversially epistemically inequivalent. The normal process
of scientific discovery will weed them out. One might say the same about the
underdetermination we just confronted – i.e., hope that it goes away – but
what I have in mind at present are relatively uncontroversial choices dictated
by theory development.
Consider Bohmian mechanics. Central to the theory is the choice of a beable
(e.g., particles) and a guidance equation describing the dynamics of that beable.
There is some freedom in both choices. Let’s take a look.
Bohmians provide a dynamics for their beables to “surf” wavefunctions.
Wavefunctions evolve according to linear wave equations in quantum mechan-
ics, such as the famous Schro¨dinger equation. Bohm’s theory relies on a crucial
feature of such equations, namely, that they imply a continuity equation, a local
form of conservation. What is conserved is the probability density through time.
That density determines the chance of finding a particle at a location at a time.
Bohmian mechanics is based on the simple insight of using this conservation
and its associated conserved current to define the velocity guiding the beables,
just as one does in fluid mechanics and elsewhere. Supplemented with the claim
that the particles are initially randomly distributed, the theory is empirically
adequate in the non-relativistic regime.
Many other choices of guidance equation also prove to be empirical adequate.
Add any divergence-less vector field (divided by the probability density) to the
original velocity. The continuity equation does not “see” this addition. Hence
this new modified velocity will also be empirically adequate. Yet this additional
vector field is arbitrary, characterizing indefinitely large and potentially wild
deviations from the original Bohm velocity.
This case may be a benign form of underdetermination. When discover-
ing scientific theories, scientists use a variety of non-empirical issues as guides.
Some, like simplicity, raise worries because simplicity may be in the eye of the
beholder, but other considerations seem uncontroversially “scientific” and are a
poor basis for serious worries about underdetermination. Such considerations
may constrain the form of the Bohm velocity. Durr et al 1992, for instance, claim
that the original choice is the unique Galilean-invariant velocity (but see Skow
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2010). Peruzzi and Rimini 2000 claim that it is the unique choice that works
also for the center-of-mass of the Bohmian configuration, a desirable feature for
many reasons. So there is plenty of reason to expect the form of the velocity to
be whittled down by ordinary scientific reasons encountered in discovery.
Turn to the choice of beable. Consider two cases, one, the choice in the orig-
inal theory, and two, the choice when we move to field extensions. The usual
choice in the non-relativistic particle theory is to choose particles with determi-
nate position as the basic ontology. There are good reasons for this choice, as
other choices such as momentum don’t solve the measurement problem. How-
ever, it’s well-known that one can add additional beables to the theory, such
as spin. In fact, there is a general recipe for adding new “basic” properties to
Bohm particles (see Holland 1995). These additions do seem akin to Norton’s
parasites. The measurement outcomes are recorded in position (“up”, “down”
and so on). The wavefunction and particle positions together entail the spin
vector representing the spin beables. Absent an independent reason to exploit
the spin vector, it seems that Occam’s razor will quickly remove the basic spins
from the Bohmian particles — and with them this alternative formulation.
Turning to quantum field theory, matters really open up (see Struyve 2011
for an excellent review). Bohmians face choices between adding particle or field
beables. In his original paper, Bohm proposed a field beable for the electromag-
netic field, an actual field configuration corresponding to the transverse part of
the vector potential. One can do something similar for other boson fields, but
this approach is hard to extend to fermionic fields. A radical response to this
trouble is just to get rid of fermions altogether. Measurement results will get
recorded in bosons, so in some sense they are “enough” for empirical adequacy.
On this “minimalist” approach, there are no fermions but the wavefunctional
carries a label representing what would be their degrees of freedom — so the
boson field behaves as if there were fermions around. One can dress up the
bosonic fields via the method used for spin vectors mentioned above, providing
a sense in which there are fermions, but Occam’s Razor will slice these prop-
erties away as quickly as it would the above spin properties. The other way
to go is with particles rather than fields. Ironically, the particle picture works
well for fermions but less well for bosons. In Bell 1987 fermion particle number
is defined but there is no configuration for bosons. We can also entertain a
hybrid theory, one treating fermions as particles and bosons as fields, which is
how we treat electrons and photons in classical electromagnetism. In sum, we
have choices between particles or fields and even whether bosons or fermions
exist! Then again, the overdetermination here may be overstated. Right now
approaches are getting eliminated or favored for normal reasons of physics, e.g.,
no natural measure for Grassman fields, Euler angles not solving the measure-
ment problem. Work is ongoing, and as theories are extended they meet more
constraints. It would be premature to say that quantum field theory yields
rampant underdetermination for Bohmians.
I’ve concentrated on the Bohmian case, but the other two research programs
face similar issues. If Collapse posits non-wavefunction beables (e.g., matter
density, flashes), one will face similar questions about what is the right beable.
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There are also additional choices: the hit rate and collapse width, the “trigger”
for collapse (particle number, mass, Weyl curvature, Riemannian curvature),
and more. Everettian theories likewise need to choose whether to add a beable
(e.g., mass density) or not. Even if not, questions remain that can possibly
lead to numerous theories, such as determining the microscopic ontology of the
Everettian world. Wallace and Timpson 2010 make one proposal (spacetime
points with properties) but there are alternatives. As in the Bohm case, I suspect
that most of these decisions will be decided by normal theory development and
not cause widespread underdetermination. That said, given the uncertainty, we
enjoy no guarantee that this will be the case.
4 Quarantine
If what I’ve argued is on the right track, then we have serious scientific under-
determination of theory by data striking right at the heart of our most basic
successful scientific theory of the world. One natural reaction is to quaran-
tine this underdetermination to some specific regime and free some theoretical
claims from epistemic danger. The intuition behind the quarantine strategy is
that the disagreement between these camps is isolated to esoteric bits of the
theory. These esoteric bits are where physicists have little confidence; instead,
what they are confident about are the core explanations of typical quantum
phenomena, and on these, each camp agree. Where the three camps agree on
some theoretical claim, that claim is not subject to underdetermination. On its
face this position strikes me as tempting and plausible.
Let’s spell the position out slightly more carefully. To be interesting, the
claims that the quarantine strategy must protect are
1. theoretical
2. not merely mathematical
3. specifically quantum.
Let me explain. Demand 1 should be uncontroversial. We’re focusing on at-
tempts to rescue realism. We already know that all three programs get the ob-
servables right — that’s what it is to solve the measurement problem. Demand 2
should also be uncontroversial. We’re after scientific realism, not mathematical
realism. All the research programs agree that 2 + 2 = 4. Yet that doesn’t tell
us much about unobservable contingent physics. Demand 3 is imposed because
we’re interested in whether realism can reach into the quantum realm. Just as
the three programs may agree on the observables associated with macroscopic
objects, they may also agree on some unobservables for some systems as we move
into the classical limit. Quantum decoherence is a process whereby interactions
among constituents of a system and its environment lead to the suppression of
quantum interference. This process occurs in all three programs. The issue is








Fig. 2: Quarantine Zone
But that’s not so satisfying if we want to know whether we should be real-
ists about coherent quantum systems. Decoherence may provide a defensible
quarantine strategy that frees some claims about unobservables, but hopefully
we can do better than secure realism only in the classical domain of quantum
theories.
The rules are set. Are there substantive claims about the specifically quan-
tum realm that are shared by all three of our research programs? We know
there is massive agreement from above: they all agree on the observables, per-
haps even the classical limits. They all disagree way down below: for instance,
we won’t find continuous Bohmian particle trajectories in Collapse or Everett.
What about in between? Although the real world and real theory of it are way
more complicated, Figure 2 provides a toy model of the setup.
4.1 “Textbook” Quarantine Zone
In a little discussed paper, Alberto Cordero 2001 offers what I think is one of
the best ways of finding a quarantine zone. His idea, as above, is that the three
camps overlap considerably. In his own words:
the underdetermination at hand is clearly of limited scope...all the
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mentioned competitors associate the quantum state with a peculiar
physical field, all include the Schro¨dinger equation centrally in the
dynamics, all endorse a strong form of ontic-structural nonsepara-
bility, and all agree on geometrical relations between subsystems
(internal molecular shapes, atomic and quark structure, etc.). By
contrast, divergence between the competing models is peculiarly con-
fined to certain specific respects and degrees of precision, with clear
significance limited to some fundamental questions...So, although
the case makes for an intense ontological debate, its corrosive power
on belief seems confined to just some aspects of the full narrative.
The encountered underdetermination does strike realist theorizing
from a certain depth down, but then again only along certain lines
of inquiry. 307
Having provided examples of convergence amongst our three programs, Cordero
concludes that many hypotheses about the quantum world are safe from the
quantum blight.
Cordero mentions many areas where the programs converge, but I want to
focus on what I’ll dub textbook quantum mechanics. By this I mean the narra-
tives found in quantum textbooks about what’s going on in quantum systems.
Here I’m thinking about Cordero’s claim that the research programs agree on
“geometrical relations between subsystems (internal molecular shapes, atomic
and quark structure, etc.)” but also similar examples he gives throughout, e.g.,:
Take, for example, the basic quantum mechanical model of the water
molecule, with its atom of oxygen bonded to two atoms of hydro-
gen, the latter making with the former an angle of about 103* in
“normal” thermodynamical conditions. Stuff like this is contained in
approximate partial models shared by all the viewed theories. . . .
[M]uch in the quantum mechanical story about water molecules and
their interaction seems at least as credible as the most ordinary talk
about, say, cats and common objects. 309
Cordero doesn’t associate his position with textbooks, so he shouldn’t be sad-
dled with my interpretation. If preferable, we can say this idea is inspired by
Cordero’s examples and not his position. In any case, I want to focus on this
claim because it strikes me as new and interesting. Textbook physics seems
interpretation neutral. We feel that we can trust what they say about typical
quantum systems (e.g., claims about orbits, molecular structure, the behavior
of energy, tunneling phenomena, and so on) while bracketting the measurement
problem. At a certain “depth” trust runs out, e.g., whether the theory is deter-
ministic or based on particles. Yet these are deep metaphysical questions that
do not touch quantum textbook claims.
In fact, I think the conjecture about what I’m calling textbook quantum me-
chanics is more plausible than his initial claims quoted above. Tease apart what
I’m calling the textbook claim from his initial claim that “all the mentioned
competitors associate the quantum state with a peculiar physical field” and so
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on. That initial claim about the quantum state might strike readers as true–but
at best it’s only approximately true. The normalization one does in Collapse
will slightly change the state used, and differences in decoherence might imply
slightly different Bohmian effective wavefunctions from the wavefunctions asso-
ciated with branches in Everett (the analogues of the quantum state assigned
to sub-systems in each program). More importantly, the agreement may only
exist at the mathematical level. What the quantum state represents can vary
dramatically amongst research programs. Similar claims can be made about
the dynamical equation, although here the differences between Collapse and the
rest are starker. The most mathematically sophisticated versions of Collapse,
continuous spontaneous localization theories, propose stochastic nonlinear wave
equations; the stochastic modifications are crucial to the theory and have huge
structural ramifications (e.g., regarding norm preservation). Structurally they
are importantly distinct from the Schro¨dinger equation. For these reasons I
want to reject Cordero’s first set of claims.
Proponents of structural realism (McKenzie 2017) may insist that all three
programs share substantial core structure, namely, the structure of Hilbert
space, the operator formalism, commutation relations, Born’s rule, and more.
Structural realists modify realism by retreating to the mathematical or struc-
tural relations in a theory. But the claim of a common structure here would be
overblown. The operator formalism — for all three programs — is simply a mea-
surement formalism, a tool added to the core theory, not the theory itself. For
the Bohmian, for instance, experiments define maps from initial wavefunctions
to distributions of particle positions. Bohmian commitments imply this map is
bilinear. Bilinear maps are equivalent to positive operator valued measures and
the traditional quantum operators are particularly simple expressions of these
(Daumer et al 1996). Bohmians could in principle just speak of the particle
distributions directly and skip all of this — at least as far as fundamental the-
ory goes. The same goes for the Everettian but regarding the quantum state.
The conventional “word-world” connection used by Copenhagen is abandoned.
That interpretation understood the operator formalism as being a guide to the
“properties” of a system (a system has a property associated with an operator
iff its state lives in the subspace that the operator projects the state onto). But
none of the programs we’re looking at employ this connection. Stripped of its
connection to the unobservable quantum world, what’s left behind is a useful
algorithm for predicting measurement outcomes and no more. True, at some
emergent measurement level that algorithm is shared. Yet that level is observ-
able and therefore not relevant to rescuing any kind of realism. The operator
formalism is the wrong place to look for substantial physical overlap.
Back to quantum textbooks. Cordero’s claim, disentangled from structural
realism, is independently attractive. When we probe it, however, it faces trouble.
Recall that for realism to be interesting in this context, theoretical claims must
satisfy at least three demands. They must be non-mathematical, theoretical,
and specifically quantum. Do Cordero’s examples meet these criteria? Do other
quantum textbook claims? I think it’s pretty clear that these claims are not
held in common amongst programs, not with each other, and not with what
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textbooks say. Divergent physical pictures emerge as soon as we peek into
anything quantum. Extracting “what textbooks say” can be a bit of an art, but
I suspect my readings agree with conventional wisdom. I’ll typically focus on
the Bohm case, as it provides many worked out physical systems that diverge
sharply from the quantum textbooks, and crucially, the other interpretations;
but this focus is for convenience only.
4.2 Water and Bonds
Let’s begin with the assertion quoted above about water, its bonds, internal
angles, and so on. These propositions are non-mathematical and about the un-
observable level, but are they quantum? Not necessarily. Claims about the com-
position of water, derived from stoichiometry, go all the way back to Lavoisier!
Crystallography and x-ray diffraction then added to our knowledge of water’s
structure, but this was based on theoretical work by G.N. Lewis and experimen-
tal work by van Laue — both safely pre-quantum. The currently used angle of
104.5 degrees is based on crystallography experiments. Cordero may respond
that the experimental value is often considered a confirmation of quantum ef-
fects, as a simple textbook quantum treatment puts the value at the nearby
109 degrees. But we could still say what Cordero does about water had nei-
ther Schro¨dinger nor Heisenberg ever existed. Experiment plus some minimal
non-quantum theory would have been enough.
The danger of confusing insights from experiments for quantum posits exists
even with water’s subcomponents. Peeking at hydrogen (more in a moment),
note that the accepted bond strengths and bond lengths are based entirely on
classical physics and experiment. Other claims about orbits, deriving from the
famous Bohr model, are based upon semi-classical theories. Claims from such
theories are not quantum. A fully quantum treatment of hydrogen will include
specifically quantum effects. I grant that a vague boundary exists between what
is quantum and what is not in chemistry. Linus Pauling’s famous work on the
chemical bond is probably the beginning of a fully quantum treatment, although
I’m no historian and I’m happy to concede the boundary to Cordero.
In any case, our first lesson is that many plausibly “safe” statements about
bonds and angles are not truly quantum.
4.3 Tunneling
Tunneling is without doubt a purely quantum effect, one studied in every quan-
tum textbook. It was used by Gamow and Gurney and Condon to explain the
emission of alpha particles from unstable nuclei. Because the attractive potential
of the nuclei is much larger than the kinetic energy of the alpha particles, such
observed emission is impossible classically but possible quantum mechanically.
Textbooks typically explain how tunneling is possible by treating a system
of particles of energy E incident from the left beamed at a one-dimensional
potential step of height V , where E < V . An approximate plane wave solution
to the Schro¨dinger equation is given, where the wavefunction to the left of the
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barrier is supposed to represent a superposition of a wave going to the right
toward the barrier and a reflected wave going to the left, and the wavefunction
to the right of the barrier represents a wave that is transmitted through the
barrier. Textbooks calculate the probability of transmission by showing that
it is a function of the incoming and reflected fluxes, demonstrating that for
certain ratios this probability is non-zero – hence demonstrating the possibility
of tunneling.
Given this wavefunction, one can work out the Bohmian trajectories that
are then implied. Assuming it is a case of tunneling — and therefore that the
incident wave is bigger than the reflected one — it follows that the probability
current is positive. Because the probability density is positive, the velocity of the
particles is therefore positive too. Hence there is nothing reflected at all. The
alleged “particles that reflect” actually all have positive velocity toward the right !
So there is no reflection even when the reflection coefficient is non-zero and the
transmission coefficient is not one. The reflection/transmission coefficients used
in the textbooks don’t have anything to do with the actual Bohmian motion.
Here we have a massive departure from the physics promoted by the textbooks.
You might reasonably have hoped that all the interpretations would agree with
the minimal implication found in the textbooks on the most canonical system,
namely, that something is reflected to the left. That is not the case.2
4.4 Hydrogen
This case is simple but instructive. The hydrogen atom was the first system
treated quantum mechanically and is a staple of every textbook. The electron
is said to orbit the nucleus — or sometimes something vague about a “probability
cloud” extending a certain distance from the nucleus’s center is mentioned. But
in Bohmian mechanics, as is well-known, stationary states such as ψ = |1s >
and ψ = |2s > have constant phase and therefore the electron is at rest with
respect to the nucleus. (In the quantum potential approach to Bohm, what hap-
pens is that the so-called “quantum potential” Q balances the classical potential
V , holding the electron a fixed distance from the nucleus. Q thus provides
the quantum “pressure” keeping the electron from crashing into the nucleus as
predicted classically.) Here we have no orbits at all, contrary to the textbook
picture!
This situation can happen even when the orbital angular momentum quan-
tum number (l) is greater than zero. One can have (a kind of) momentum
without motion. The lesson is that “[q]uantum numbers do not directly rep-
resent dynamical properties” (Holland 1995, 156). This is an important point,
as the textbooks mostly assume that quantum numbers do reflect properties of
2 I admit that this example is an artifact of an inadequacy of the textbook treatment of
tunneling. The normal textbook treatment via plane waves is flawed: it’s not clear how such
stationary states justify talk of entities moving from the left and so on; worse, these waves
are not renormalizable, so they aren’t physical. A better treatment is possible (see Norsen
2013). Nonetheless, this case is a nice one to use here because this (albeit flawed) textbook
treatment of tunneling is so common and the straightforward Bohmian consequence is so at
odds with it.
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a system. An advocate of the quarantine strategy might hope for that much.
If we briefly turn to collapse theories, note that on a “flash” ontology picture
a lone hydrogen atom is most likely literally nothing. The world is populated
with flashes only when collapses occur, but we would in all likelihood have to
wait thousands of years for a hydrogen atom to collapse. On a mass density
interpretation, by contrast, the mass or matter will be smeared out across all
components of the superposed atom.
Bohmians and textbooks don’t agree about hydrogen until the observable
level. Agreement exists because the observables require an experiment, and
hence a physical interaction, one that changes the state of the hydrogen atom
(and in particular, gets the electrons to where they need to be). Below the
surface of the observable Bohmians also disagree with Collapse and Everett
about the behavior of hydrogen atoms.
4.5 Two Path Experiments
Consider the sort of typical two-path interference experiment commonly found
in textbooks. A spin-1/2 particle enters a Stern-Gerlach device oriented so as
to separate x-up from x-down particles. Depending upon its initial position,
the Bohm particle either follows the upward wavepacket or the downward one.
Deflectors are added to the setup that deflect the upward wavepacket down-
ward and the downward one upward. The wavepackets meet at location I,
symmetric between the up and down paths, and then continue on their way, the
initially upward wavepacket heading downward to A’ and the initially downward
wavepacket heading upward to B’. Measurements can be made at A’ and B’.
Textbooks describing such a case of course do not assume that there are par-
ticles traveling definite trajectories. Often we’re told that because the particle
is in a superposition it simultaneously travels both paths. Whatever is going
on, it is assumed that if the particle is measured at A’ then it came from A and
if it is measured at B’ then it came from B. Something is traveling from A to
A’ or B to B’ or both.
What happens in Bohm’s theory? Because the Bohm velocity equation is
first order and deterministic, trajectories cannot cross in configuration space.
That fact, coupled to the additional fact that spin is a feature of wavefunctions
and not particles, force Bohmian trajectories sometimes to behave in highly non-
classical and surprising ways. In the experiment at hand, due to the symmetry
of the setup, trajectories would have to cross at I for a particle from A to go to
A’ or from B to go to B’. Hence the probability of finding a Bohm particle at
the exact line of symmetry intersecting what would be the intersection point is
zero. In terms of the quantum potential, what happens is that it grows infinitely
large at that point in configuration space, pushing all particles away. The result:
Bohm trajectories bounce at I! Loosely put, a particle from A will “ride” that
wavepacket until location I, but there, where the x-up and x-down wavepackets
overlap, the particle will jump ship and hitch a ride with the originally downward
wavepacket, creating the bounce. Particles found at B’ originate at A and those







Fig. 3: Two Path Setup
You might reply that the standard textbook doesn’t clearly commit to some
ontology traveling from A to A’ or B to B’. I agree that, ontologically speaking,
the standard interpretation says little that is clear. Yet conventional quantum
wisdom here is not ambiguous. In fact, the understanding that what is found
at A’ came from A is so strong that it was a central premise in an attempt
by Englert et al 1992 to falsify Bohm’s theory. In the so-called “surrealistic
trajectories” debate, beautifully diagnosed by Barrett 2000, the main issue was
that Englert et al assumed that they knew, from quantum theory, that the “real”
trajectories didn’t bounce.
4.6 Bohr Orbits
Perhaps I’m missing Cordero’s point. Cordero suggests that there are layers of
models that exist in quantum physics. The idea might be that many of these
models are shared in common amongst quantum programs. Although not purely
quantum, there is, for example, the Bohr model of the atom, and the BCS
model of superconductors. There are also whole theories and interpretations
of this “middle layer,” such as semiclassical mechanics and the semiclassical
interpretation. Again I find myself drawn to Cordero’s position. His picture
of physics as complex sets of models covering different regimes is much more
realistic than that of many philosophers. One wouldn’t be surprised if Everett,
Collapse and Bohm, ever the enemies, end up holding hands in peace at the
semiclassical level. Alas, I don’t think that is so either. Let’s agree to relax
what we mean by quantum. Now we just want significant claims about the
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unobservable that aren’t purely in the classical domain. That might not be
enough to justify a realism about the quantum, but it would be a start.
Start with Bohr orbits. Consider hydrogen again and now its orbits. In the
Bohm theory, when the electron is not at rest it orbits the z-axis with constant
speed and radius and is independent of mass. In the Bohr model, by contrast,
the electron traces out orbits in the equatorial plane and the radius is a function
of mass. The orbits are around different axes and one is a function of mass yet
the other isn’t. (See Fortin et al 2017 for this case and more.) They’re different
and it’s hard to see how one approximates the other in any way. Again, at the
measurement level, the Bohmian will be able to explain why the Bohr model
worked as well as it did; but the reason isn’t that Bohm particles travel the
same orbits.
4.7 Semiclassical Particle in a Box
A field known as semiclassical physics (associated with the physicist Gutzwiller)
develops and examines connections between classical orbits and quantum fluctu-
ations. In this area, a system is understood to be “semiclassical” if the classical
action is large compared to quantum ~. One finds semiclassical trajectories in
this approach as one deals with chaos and other topics in dynamical systems
theory. A tempting thought is that we’ll find that as we approach the observable
level, there will be agreement below the surface of the observable on the semi-
classical trajectories. However, Matzin and Nurock 2008 show that semiclassical
orbits differ dramatically from Bohmian orbits.
A simple example of the difference is the particle in a box. Using the typi-
cal wavefunction for such cases and assuming one-dimension and fixed energy,
the Bohm particle will just sit still (unless you pull a wall away rapidly (Cal-
lender and Weingard 1998)). The semiclassical orbits, by contrast, give two
classical orbits at each position in the box, one going in each direction, i.e.,
particles bouncing back and forth. Matzin and Nurock display other examples
of divergence too, including (not surprisingly) hydrogen. Bohm’s theory sug-
gests a physical picture demonstrably at odds with the trajectories used in a
semiclassical treatment.
4.8 Summary
Most of what we say about the quantum realm is “interpretation” dependent.
The research programs described here portray radically different worlds from
top to bottom, agreeing on little more than what is observable. I provided some
examples but could multiply them easily, e.g., Bohmian Fermi-Dirac particles
are not always repelled nor Bose-Einstein particles always attracted (Holland
1995, 310). I could also have used more examples from Collapse or Everett, so
the response that these cases just show that Bohm is weird or unusual isn’t sus-
tainable. I cannot prove Cordero wrong. I have not gone through all of quantum
mechanics and shown that there is nothing safe from the blight. Some models
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and systems may be safe. But these would be more like small disconnected
islands of reprieve, not anything like a full quarantine zone.
5 Reaction: There Can Only Be One?
If I am right, there are at least three major research programs that each portray
different worlds but that are compatible with the current empirical evidence.
This situation poses a threat to the epistemic ambitions of the realist, someone
who believes that mature successful theories are well-confirmed and approxi-
mately true. We can’t say one program is well-confirmed and approximately
true if we know that there are two others, equally well-confirmed, that contra-
dict its hypotheses.
Before considering realist reactions, note that the situation isn’t horribly
dire. We hardly have guaranteed underdetermination by an indefinite number
of theories. Three is a small number. We could apportion our degrees of belief
over these three programs and not be at a complete loss when it comes to claims
about the unobservable quantum world.3
Quantum underdetermination isn’t, therefore, a disaster for realism. It is
still disappointing. Can we do better? Ultimately there are two options, fight
or flight. Realism could retreat by restricting its ambitions to claims that are
interpretation neutral, as Hoefer (this volume) does. Quarantine works if the
wall is placed around the observable level. Arguably, it also works in the po-
tentially unobservable classical domain sector of quantum theory — although
this is a tricky question and I have my doubts. Alternatively, we can fight this
judgement by turning up the “scientific” dial. That is, we can use traditional
realist features such as simplicity, unification, explanatoriness, and so on to de-
cide which research program is best. We agreed that there are at least three
options when the dial is set at “scientific.” That might be too low a standard.
None of the programs are cheap philosophical playthings, but that doesn’t mean
they are all equally well confirmed.
Let’s briefly explore the more aggressive option of turning up the dial. I
began the essay with a metaphor based on Greg Egan’s clever and sophisticated
book, Quarantine. I end with one based on a terribly acted and weakly plotted
fantasy film, The Highlander (1986). In the film a group of (nearly) immor-
tal warriors battle through history, dying only through decapitation. The last
remaining will win the Prize. Warriors get stronger each time they kill one of
their own. They know that, in the end, there can only be one. While I don’t
expect proponents of the different research programs to go away any time soon
3 Could we repartition our programs and narrow down to two? What I have in mind
is focusing on ontology and tipping theories into wavefunction-only and wavefunction-plus
camps. Some versions of Everett and Collapse will then join Bohm in the wavefunction-plus
camp, as they add a beable to the wavefunction in their basic ontology. I’m not a big fan of
this repartitioning as it obscures major differences. For instance, Wallace 2017 shows that the
branches corresponding to wavefunction-only GRW tails are qualitatively different from their
Everettian counterparts, so the wavefunction-only camp includes very different worlds. More
importantly, scientific realism is not only about the ontology but also the laws of the theory,
and this partitioning ignores that fact.
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— and I certainly hope that they don’t resort to Highlander-like tactics — it
may be that when we turn up the dial, only one remains.
But which one?
Wallace (this volume) asserts that there is no underdetermination in quan-
tum mechanics, that there is only Everett. His argument is that Everett and
only Everett has been successfully applied to all of current physics. Bohm and
Collapse lag behind, slogging their way through the history of quantum theory.
Specifically, those research programs must develop relativistic and field theo-
retic versions of quantum theory, whereas it takes no time at all to make these
versions Everettian. Put in terms of research programs, the idea is that the Ev-
erettian program is ahead of its rivals. When the dial is set to include empirical
reach or size of domain, there is no underdetermination serious enough to cause
alarm.4
Some proponents of structural realism also claim that there is no under-
determination; indeed, some motivate this type of realism via its ability to
overcome quantum underdetermination. Since the mathematical structure of
Collapse, Bohm and Everett differ so markedly, how could such a position ever
get off the ground? In at least one case, the answer is that such realists deny
that Collapse and Bohm merit consideration! Ladyman and Ross 2007, in their
polemic against unmoored speculative metaphysics, claim that any response to
the measurement problem that takes standard quantum mechanics to be an
incomplete description of reality is an example of extravagant epistemically ir-
responsible metaphysics rather than good metaphysics or science (181). We can
understand this as turning the dial to a very specific (and odd) setting.5
For a quite different judgement, consider Jean Bricmont’s 2016 position when
confronting quantum underdetermination. He argues that “there is no existing
alternative to de Broglie-Bohm that reaches the level of clarity and explanatory
4 To be clear, the issue is more subtle than just described. There are indeed plenty of
Bohmian field theories. There are also extensions of the theory to quantum gravity, quantum
cosmology, superstring theory, quantum chemistry, and more. If Bohmian or Collapse answers
to problems in new realms can’t be reproduced by Everett then it’s not clear who is more
progressive. The Bohmian answer to the problem of time in canonical quantum gravity, for
example, is not replicable in an Everettian framework, nor is the Collapse approach to the
information loss paradox. The reason I put these points aside for the moment is that, overall,
I agree that quantum field theory as a target dwarfs these examples in importance, and it’s
also fair to say that Bohmian or Collapse versions of the standard model of particle physics
are a ways off.
5 I cannot fully respond to this charge here due to the editor’s demand for polite, professional
language. I’ll just note that the following people have developed “completions” of quantum
mechanics: Louise de Broglie, John Slater, Erwin Madelung, Albert Einstein, Nathan Rosen,
Jean-Pierre Vigier, David Bohm, Hans Freistadt and John Bell. This list includes some of
the top physicists who have ever lived. Scores of mathematicians and physicists the world
over continue this work, e.g., Peter Holland, Sheldon Goldstein, Detleff Du¨rr, B.J. Hiley, Nino
Zanghi, Roderich Tumulka, and publish rigorous advances in the best physics journals, e.g.,
Physical Review. Bohm’s original paper has over 5000 citations. Appeal to authority is an
improper argument form, I agree, but we can use it as a shortcut to a longer case I could
make and ask: given the extrinsic markers of epistemic quality just listed, which is the more
likely to be extravagant metaphysics, or a progressive research program, the work of Einstein,
Bell and others in our best physics journals, or ontic structural realism?
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power of the latter” (228). Bricmont sees the threat of quantum underdeter-
mination and adopts the Highlander move of eliminating alternatives. Unlike
Wallace or Ladyman and Ross, he opts for Bohm as the last one standing, a
judgement based on emphasizing explanatory virtues. We might understand
Bricmont as employing confirmation understood as inference to the best expla-
nation (Lipton 1991). According to such theories, for T to be confirmed by E, T
must not only imply E but T must be the best explanation of E. Bohmians feel
that the nuts-and-bolts accounts the theory provides of the stability of matter,
uncertainty relations, interference, apparent wavefunction collapse, tunneling
phenomena, and more is a major reason to adopt the theory. In a note added
to the paperback edition of his Bohmian masterpiece, Holland stresses that the
primary virtue of the Bohm program is its “quality of explanation” (1995, xix),
much like that he finds in Darwinian reasoning. If this is right – and it certainly
fits with my thoughts on the matter – one can imagine a Lipton-style argument
to the effect that Bohm is better confirmed than its rivals. We turned up the
dial once and eliminated the Cartesian demon. We turn the knob again and the
same kinds of explanatory virtues leave only Bohm.
The debate between Wallace and Bricmont isn’t likely to be settled anytime
soon. The reason is that the very features that allow the Everettian interpreta-
tion its easy extension to new physics are precisely the same features that invite
its problems and whose solutions by other programs lead to their explanatory
virtues. Collapse swerves and Bohmian beables make probabilities relatively
straightforward in these theories, for instance, whereas understanding probabil-
ity is massively problematic in Everett. Moreover, it’s these beables and swerves
that allow the nuts and bolts explanatory narratives that attract Bohmians (and
presumably, Collapse theorists). Yet it’s these very swerves and beables that
demand new physics to be developed when quantum theory is applied to new
regimes, making extensions hardly automatic. The Everettian program is a
“minimalist” one, little more than the quantum formalism itself coupled to a
new rule for reinterpreting our definite empirical outcomes. So it is little won-
der that it can be “successfully applied” to new physics. To someone engaged
in a competing research program, trumpeting Everett’s easy application to new
physics sounds like a thief bragging about how little they had to work for their
reward. After all, the Copenhagen interpretation — and Cartesian demon the-
ory, for that matter — can make the same boast, yet many would agree that
Copenhagen — and Cartesian demon theory — are so theoretically deficient as
to take themselves out of the running. They earn their empirical progressiveness
at the cost of providing a decent theory. Naturally, the Everettian sees matters
precisely the other way around. Why are these “nuts and bolts” explanations,
whatever they are, so great, and in particular, relevant to confirmation? Absent
a compelling reply, and failing to see Everett as theoretically unsatisfactory, the
choice for the empirically more progressive program is to them a no-brainer.
My own sympathies lie with the more “nuts-and-bolts” approaches. The
point I want to make, however, is that we’re pretty close to philosophical bedrock
at this point. The Everettian and Bohmian described above aren’t merely dis-
agreeing on the correct dial setting, but they are disagreeing on the nature of
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the dial. Put somewhat simplistically, the Everettian uses a dial that repre-
sents size of empirical domain whereas the Bohmian uses a dial that represents
explanatory virtues. The choice of research program therefore hangs on deep,
hotly contested and familiar matters in philosophy of science–in particular, the
relationship, if any, between explanatory virtues and confirmation.
In sum, we have serious scientific underdetermination. The nightmare of
scientific realists is real. We’re unlikely to secure any quarantine zone that
retains much one can trust in the quantum realm. Because the differences
between programs are so stark, it’s tempting to go into Highlander mode and
declare that there can be only one. But that debate – who remains standing –
won’t go away soon because its resolution hangs on philosophical matters that
are gridlocked. Welcome, scientific realists, to the quantum foundations.6
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